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THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF OBEYING A LAW:
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL
VIEWPOINT
Robert Cooter*
INTRODUCTION
Economic theory distinguishes sharply between what a person wants and
what he can have. "Preferences" describe what a person wants, and
"constraints" describe the limits of what he can have. The collision of
preferences and constraints yields the choices that economists study. The
meaning of both terms is broad and flexible. "Preferences" include wishes,
values, desires, inclinations, attitudes, ends, goals, and objectives, and
"constraints" include resources, technology, instruments, means, budgets,
wealth, and powers.
Preferences and constraints help to distinguish between the internal and
external viewpoints that H.L.A. Hart made famous.1 The internal viewpoint
concerns preferences to perform legal obligations. A person who prefers to
obey a law is willing to give up something to perform his legal obligation.
The preference is intrinsic, not an instrument for securing something else of
value. Conversely, a person who is indifferent towards obeying or
disobeying a law is unwilling to give up anything to perform his legal
obligation. A person who is indifferent to a legal obligation takes a purely
instrumental approach towards obedience-he obeys only when doing so
secures something else of value.
What explains the distribution of preferences among people to obey a
law? I will sketch part of the answer that emerges from economic and
psychological studies. Finding an answer is important because when laws
are reasonably just and many citizens intrinsically prefer to obey them,
government is easier, and life is better than when most citizens are
indifferent towards obeying the law.
I. INTRINSIC VALUE OF OBEYING A LAW
When people want more than they can have, they must give up one thing
to get another. Scarcity forces them to decide how much they value one
* Robert Cooter is the Herman Selvin Professor of Law at the University of California at
Berkeley.
1. See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2d ed. 1994).
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thing relative to another. 2 This line of reasoning applies to obeying a law.
Obeying a law often involves a sacrifice of time, effort, resources, or
opportunities. The rate at which a person will give up these things in order
to obey a law provides a measure of the relative value of obedience to him.
Markets reduce value to money. The rate at which a person will give up
money for a good indicates his willingness to pay for it.3 By using
specialized techniques,4 economists can often find an equivalent in money
to the sacrifice of time, effort, resources, or opportunities that a person
makes to obey a law. This essay will focus on those legal obligations that
are commensurable with money. Examples include obeying the speed limit
when driving, reporting all of your income for taxes, obtaining a permit to
repair your house, not littering, sorting trash for recycling, registering your
bicycle, not eating or smoking where forbidden, cleaning up after your dog,
paying social security taxes for your housekeeper, conforming to health and
safety regulations, abating pollution, serving on juries as required, and
voting in countries where it is mandatory. In addition, civil law imposes
obligations such as performing contracts, not trespassing on property, not
making a nuisance for adjacent property owners, and taking reasonable care
-to avoid harming others.
Most people decide to violate some of these obligations occasionally and
some people violate many of these obligations systematically. Violations
are sometimes justified because they make life manageable. Widespread
violations, however, lower the quality of life for everyone and unfairly
advantage the wrongdoers. Violating one of these legal obligations often
results in a fine or civil liability. People who contemplate violating these
obligations and rationally decide what to do will compare the sanction in
dollars to the resulting gain in time, effort, resources, or opportunities. This
kind of decision making presumes commensurability with money.
Figure 1 assumes that the metric of money is appropriate to measure
preferences to obey a law and depicts a plausible distribution among
citizens. Any point on the curve illustrates the proportion of people who
are willing to pay at least the corresponding amount to obey the law in
question. For example, twenty percent of the people are willing to pay at
least $p to obey the law in question. The downward slope of the curve in
this zone indicates that, as the price of obedience falls, more people are
willing to pay it.
2. This recalls the economist's joke: Colleague to economist: "How's your husband?"
Economist to colleague: "Compared to what?"
3. Willingness-to-pay is also called the "subjective price" or "subjective rate of
substitution with the numeraire good."
4. The techniques of cost-benefit analysis often require measuring the value of
nonmarket goods, such as waiting time for commuters, clean air for homeowners, or safety
for miners. The techniques are sometimes described as "hedonic indexes."
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$ Figure 1. Distribution of Willingness
M to Pay to Obey a Law
Proportion of People
Figure 2 demarcates three zones in Figure 1. The zone labeled
"internalize" contains all the people who are willing to pay something to
obey the law in question. The zone labeled "indifferent" contains all the
people who are unwilling to pay anything to obey or disobey the law in
question. People who are indifferent take a purely instrumental view
towards obeying or disobeying the law.
In a reasonably just society, most people prefer to obey most laws, and
some people are indifferent towards obeying some laws. A few people,
however, invert social values and follow the philosophy articulated by
Satan in Milton's Paradise Lost when he said, "Evil be thou my Good." 5
These people intrinsically value disobeying a law. The zone labeled
"inverted" in Figure 2 contains the few people who are willing to pay
something to disobey the law in question. As depicted in Figure 2,
internalization of obedience to a law varies among people from positive
("good citizens"), to zero ("indifferent"), to negative ("inverted").
$ Figure 2. Three Zones of Willingness
E to Pay to Obey a Law
internalize indiffe inverted
ent
0% 25% 50% 70% "l10%
Proportion of People
5. John Milton, Paradise Lost, in 32 Great Books of the Western World 152, 154
(Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952).
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Faced with a choice, people must ask themselves how much they are
willing to sacrifice to obey a law. A good citizen can take his intrinsic
value of obedience as a guide to action. An indifferent citizen, who places
no intrinsic value on obedience, cannot find this guide within himself.
Instead, he must decide by looking to the consequences of obedience for
things that he cares about. Finally, an evil person can also take intrinsic
value as a guide, although his valuation is inverted.
We have been discussing breaches of minor legal duties-taxes, permits,
recycling, registration, cleaning up, abating, keeping promises, exercising
reasonable care, etc.-whose individual effects are often small and whose
aggregate effects are often large. In contrast, most people in a well-ordered
society never seriously contemplate committing the worst crimes, such as
murder, treason, arson, assault, battery, blackmail, grand theft, fraud, rape,
or child molestation. For these crimes, the question of trade-offs does not
arise in the minds of most people, but it does arise for a small number of
evil people. The sanction for these crimes is usually imprisonment. This
punishment is commensurable with money for some people, but more often
it is incommensurable for practical or theoretical reasons.
The practical problem of incommensurability arises when a cost exceeds
the amount that a person has the ability to pay. To illustrate this concretely,
assume that a person is willing to pay all of his wealth to avoid a sentence
of ninety days in jail. Given this fact, it makes no sense to ask how much
more he would be willing to pay to avoid increasing the sentence from
ninety to one hundred days. In general, willingness to pay for something
only measures its value to someone with the ability to pay for it, and most
violent criminals have limited ability to pay for anything.
Besides the practical problem of incommensurability, some goods resist
measurement in money for intrinsic reasons. For example, courts need to
set damages in tort cases involving death, disfigurement, illness, bodily
injury, alienation of affections, and loss of reputation. After careful
reflection, however, many people do not believe that any amount of money
would make them indifferent between suffering the injury and receiving the
money. Thus, loving parents cannot name any amount of money,
regardless of size, that would make them indifferent to their child's death.
Indeed, parents who could name such a sum of money would be moral
monsters. Economists cannot assign a money equivalent to the loss because
none exists, even in theory.6
Moralists may have serious crimes and devastating injuries in mind when
they argue that money cannot measure the value of obeying the law, when
they claim that a good citizen will pay any price to obey the law, or that
obeying the law advantages a person by contributing to his moral
perfection. Speaking like these moralists, however, makes no sense when
6. See generally Robert Cooter, Hand Rule Damages for Incompensable Losses, 40 San
Diego L. Rev. 1097 (2003).
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discussing the minor legal obligations that are this essay's subject. For
these minor legal obligations, people decide what to do by making trade-
offs, including trade-offs reducible to money.
II. COST OF OBEYING A LAW
Now I turn from preferences to constraints. I have already mentioned
that disobeying minor legal obligations usually results in a fine or liability,
and performing these obligations often involves a sacrifice of time, effort,
resources, or opportunities that is commensurable with money. Reducing
all of these costs to money yields a value for the net cost of obeying a law,
which I have inserted in Figure 3. The cost line is flat in Figure 3 because I
assume that the cost of obeying the law does not vary with respect to the
person in question. The intersection of the cost line and the willingness-to-
pay curve gives the equilibrium proportion of people who obey the law. As
depicted in Figure 3, half of the people are willing to pay the cost of
obeying the law, so obedience equals fifty percent.
$ Figure 3. Equilibrium Level ofObedience to a Law
Cost
% 25% 50% 70% 0%
Proportion of People
Note that if the cost curve in Figure 3 shifted down until it was below the
horizontal axis, the cost of obeying the law in question would be negative.
These facts correspond to a situation where the effort, time, resources, etc.,
required to obey the law are less than the sanction for disobeying it. In
these circumstances, people who place no intrinsic value on obedience will
obey the law. The only people who will disobey the law in these
circumstances are the ones who intrinsically value disobedience.
A law's sanction is sometimes described as the "price of disobedience."
Sanctions have some similarities to market prices, but the differences are
more striking. Markets often give quantity discounts-buy more goods and
pay less for each one. Sanctions often impose quantity surcharges-
disobey more and pay more for each act. Thus, the Federal Sentencing
12792006]
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Guidelines enhance punishment for repeat offenders. 7  In addition,
sanctions often impose "intentionality surcharges"-disobey intentionally
and pay more, disobey accidentally and pay less. Thus damages that
tortfeasors pay often increase for harms caused intentionally rather than
recklessly, or for harms caused recklessly rather than negligently.
Why do legal sanctions give surcharges for recidivism or intentionality,
whereas markets give quantity discounts? Purchases in markets are
permitted, so paying the market price of a good justifies taking it.
Lawbreaking, however, is forbidden, so paying the sanction does not justify
disobeying a law. People who disobey the law repeatedly or intentionally
deserve a higher sanction, and a higher sanction is probably needed to deter
them.
Whenever the law imposes quantity surcharges for recidivism or
intentionality, the law signals that breaking the law in question is
intrinsically wrong. Good citizens respond by obeying the law out of
respect for it. In contrast, when the law does not impose quantity
surcharges, the law gives ambiguous signals about whether or not breaking
the law is intrinsically wrong. For example, people who accumulate many
parking tickets in American cities usually pay no surcharge, and sometimes
they can bargain for quantity discounts. Given this fact, ordinary citizens
inevitably disagree over whether there is anything wrong with overstaying
in a parking place and then paying the fine.
Similarly, compensatory damages in civil cases are based on the actual
harm suffered by the victim, which is almost always independent of the
wrongdoer's recidivism or intent. When a civil wrong triggers
compensatory damages without the possibility of punitive damages, as with
almost all breaches of contract, the law provides an ambiguous signal about
whether the defendant's act was intrinsically wrong. Given the law's
ambiguous signal, scholars inevitably disagree about whether or not breach
of contract is intrinsically wrong. Critics also sharply disagree over the
"efficient breach hypothesis," which asserts that breach is acceptable
whenever performance costs the promisor more than the promisee gains
from it.8 (The efficient breach hypothesis has spread confusion by
conflating breach and renegotiation when performance is inefficient.)9
7. See generally Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, ch. II, 98
Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
8. See Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1989); see
also Melvin Eisenberg, The Theory of Efficient Breach and the Theory of Efficient
Termination (Berkeley Law & Econ. Workshop, Working Paper No. 14, 2004), available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/berkeley-law-econ/spring2004/14/.
9. When nonperformance is inefficient, it can be achieved by breaching the contract or
by renegotiating it to allow for nonperformance. The courts can channel the promisor to
renegotiate by not allowing him to keep the surplus from breach. A numerical example
explaining these facts is found in Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics 254-61
(4th ed. 2004).
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III. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL VIEWPOINTS AS DECISIONS
The distinction between preferences and constraints points to a model of
the internal and external viewpoints towards a law for decision making. A
person who is unwilling to pay anything to perform his legal obligation,
whom I described as "indifferent" in Figure 1, decides whether or not to
obey the law by comparing costs of obeying and disobeying:
Cost of obeying > Cost of disobeying => disobey.
Cost of obeying < Cost of disobeying => obey.
A bad citizen, such as Holmes's "bad man," 10 decides whether or not to
obey the law by this calculation.
A person who is willing to pay something to perform his legal obligation,
whom I described as "internalizing" obedience in Figure 1, has another term
in the decision formula:
Willingness-to-pay > (Cost of obeying - cost of disobeying) => obey.
Willingness-to-pay < (Cost of obeying - cost of disobeying) -> disobey.
A good citizen decides whether or not to obey the law by this calculation.
To find out how much a citizen is willing to pay to obey the law, he must
look inward and consult his intrinsic values. This is the internal point of
view. After consulting his intrinsic values, he must compare them to his
external costs in order to decide what to do.
This characterization of the internal viewpoint is consistent with many
theories of intrinsic value. Intrinsic value may come from habit,
socialization, role models, religion, or philosophy. Theories will disagree
over the intrinsic values that a person ought to have for obeying particular
laws. Disagreement causes different people to value obedience of a law
differently, as depicted in Figure 1.
Since internalization of respect for the law makes governing so much
easier, the state tries to inculcate it through education and other means. The
state also imposes sanctions with intentionality surcharges to punish people
for viewing the law extrinsically. If courts detect that a wrongdoer took a
purely instrumental viewpoint towards an illegal act, courts will often
increase the sanction for disobedience. In this respect, law requires citizens
intrinsically to value obeying it, and the internal viewpoint is a legal
obligation.
The preceding formulas refer to the cost of obedience and disobedience.
Now I consider the main elements constituting these costs. As previously
mentioned, performing an obligation often costs something in time, money,
or effort. In addition, obeying the law often requires foregoing the
10. See Robert Cooter, Self-control and Self-improvement for the "Bad Man" of
Holmes, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 903 (1998).
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opportunity to profit from disobeying it. Focusing on these two costs to the
exclusion of others yields a simple formula:
Cost of obeying the law = performance cost + opportunity cost.
Another type of cost is the sanctions for disobeying a law. Legal
sanctions are mostly fines and incarceration, and social sanctions are mostly
censure, disesteem, and boycott. Focusing on these two costs to the
exclusion of others yields this simple formula:
Cost of disobeying the law = legal sanction + social sanction.
IV. POSITIVE THEORY OF INTERNALIZATION
What advantage is gained by characterizing the internal viewpoint in
terms of preferences and constraints? The willingness-to-pay curve in
Figure 1 is a demand curve. Economists know a lot about estimating
demand. The characterization in terms of preferences and constraints
suggests how to study the internalization of laws by using techniques for
estimating demand. Someday scholars will use economic techniques to
estimate the intrinsic value of obeying a law. " I In the meantime, I can offer
a few observations about the probable results.
First, people in different societies respect and disrespect different laws,
and the patterns often seem arbitrary or random. When I was visiting a
Swiss colleague, we walked to a department store in Berne. At the store's
entrance, the shoppers left bags, bundles, and babies while they nipped
inside. I remarked to my colleague, "An American who did this in San
Francisco would have his bags and bundles stolen, and he would be arrested
for leaving his baby unattended. The Swiss are remarkably honest." He
replied, "While I was teaching in Berkeley, I was amazed to find that
students seldom cheat on exams. Swiss students think that cheating on
exams is their right, and helping others to cheat is their duty." Some data
supports the point of this anecdote-that people in different societies
internalize and externalize different legal obligations in unpredictable
patterns. 12
Second, besides this idiosyncratic component, there is a systematic
component; people in different places have different levels of respect for
law. The Economist and Transparency International publish indices of
perceived corruption by country. In 2005, Iceland was seen as the least
corrupt country in the Transparency survey, Chad and Bangladesh were
11. Economists often estimate the deterrent effects of sanctions, but they do not try to
separate "final demand" (intrinsic value) from "derived demand" (instrumental value).
12. Tax compliance is an example. In Switzerland and the United States, citizens mostly
pay their income taxes, whereas people in Belgium and France comply much less frequently.
This fact cannot be explained by a rational fear of sanctions. See Eric Posner, Law and
Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1781 (2000).
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seen as the most corrupt, and the United States ranked seventeenth.' 3 The
most striking example of corruption reduction comes from Singapore,
which is now perceived as one of the world's least corrupt countries. The
correlation between national wealth and freedom from corruption is not
only obvious in these surveys, but also imperfect. To illustrate, in 2002
France was perceived as more corrupt than Botswana. 14
Third, an individual's resolve to obey the law ebbs and flows from time
to time. Economists and psychologists have had some success in studying
time-inconsistent preferences, which philosophers call "akrasia." 15  The
most important result is that people are more consistent about their trade-
offs towards two future choices than they are about a present and a future
choice. To illustrate, assume that a child must choose between a promise to
be given one candy on Saturday or two candies on Sunday. He prefers the
two candies when he chooses on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday,
or Friday. When Saturday arrives, however, the child may switch and
choose to receive one candy immediately rather than two candies the next
day. Empirical research should suggest policies to increase resolve to obey
the law.
My discussion of internalizing a law stressed willingness to pay to obey
it. In addition, internalizing a law involves willingness to enforce it on
others. The cost of enforcing a norm on others includes the time and effort
needed to cooperate with the police and courts, the risk of retaliation when
reporting a wrongdoer to the authorities, the risk of confrontation when
intervening to prevent wrongdoing, the possibility of liability for libel when
attributing wrongdoing to another, and the higher price paid for a good in
order to boycott a particular seller. Thus, Figure 1 could be interpreted as
depicting willingness to pay to sanction others who disobey a law, and the
horizontal line in Figure 3 could be interpreted as the cost of doing so. 16
Fourth, enforcing obligations on others makes disobedience more risky
for them. In contrast, conforming to the obligation yourself often increases
the payoff to others who disobey the law. Internalization, consequently,
contributes to the level of obedience in society mostly by causing people to
enforce the legal obligation on others, not by causing them to obey the law
13. Press Release, Transparency Int'l, Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index 2005 (Oct. 18, 2005), available at
http://ww 1 .transparency.org/cpi/2005/dnld/media-pack-en.pdf.
14. Emerging-Market Indicators, Economist, Aug. 31, 2002, at 78, available at
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story-id= 1302402.
15. For the psychology of hyperbolic discounting, see George Ainslie & John
Monterosso, Will as Intertemporal Bargaining: Implications for Rationality, 151 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 825 (2003). For an economic theory of akrasia, see Jonathan Gruber & Botond
Krszegi, A Theory of Government Regulation of Addictive Bads: Optimal Tax Levels and
Tax Incidence for Cigarette Excise Taxation, 88 J. Pub. Econ. 1959 (2004).
16. For an analysis of how the expression of legal obligations can change behavior, see
Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and
Internalization, 79 Or. L. Rev. 1 (2000).
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themselves. (The elucidation of these facts is straightforward with the help
of some economic reasoning.)' 17
Fifth, when cooperating with the police, testifying in court, reporting
lawbreakers to authorities, confronting or challenging a wrongdoer,
intervening to prevent lawbreaking, or criticizing wrongdoers, there is
safety in numbers. The cost to citizens who enforce the law depends on
how many other citizens join them. By using the law expressively, officials
can change the beliefs of citizens about how many people will enforce the
law. The "expressive use of law" by officials includes publicity attached to
prosecutions, the language in which the wrong is condemned, the
connection drawn between law and morality, and the severity of the
sanction. If the expressive use of law can change the beliefs of citizens
about how many of them will enforce it, large changes in behavior can
result because the social system jumps from one equilibrium to another.
Legal expression that changes beliefs about interdependent behavior may
have greater effects on obeying the law than changes in the objective level
of sanctions.
Finally, I observe that, since contemporary economics has little to say
about how people acquire their preferences, I will not say anything in this
essay about why some people become good citizens and others become bad
citizens.
CONCLUSION
In The Fall of Rome, W.H. Auden writes,
Fantastic grow the evening gowns;
Agents of the Fisc pursue
Absconding tax-defaulters through
The sewers of provincial towns. 
18
17. For many acts, the advantage of wrongdoing decreases with the number of
wrongdoers. Thus, the profitability of theft decreases with competition from more thieves.
This is an application of the principle of decreasing marginal productivity. People who view
the law instrumentally disobey it until the point is reached where the advantage of further
wrongdoing equals the risk of being sanctioned. Starting from such equilibrium, assume that
one wrongdoer "gets religion" and switches from disobedience to obedience. Because there
is one fewer wrongdoer, the advantage from wrongdoing increases slightly, and now it
exceeds the risk of sanction. This situation is disequilibrium. To restore equilibrium,
someone who was obeying the law must switch to disobeying it. After this switch, the same
number of rights and wrongs are committed as in the old equilibrium. Thus, the wrongdoer
who "got religion" did not cause aggregate wrongdoing to decrease by changing his personal
behavior and doing the right thing.
If, however, the wrongdoer who "got religion" adds to the social sanctions against
wrongdoing, then wrongdoing will become slightly less profitable for every wrongdoer. To
restore equilibrium, the number of people committing wrongs must decrease. In the new
equilibrium, the number of rights has increased, and the number of wrongs has decreased
relative to the old equilibrium. Thus, the wrongdoer who "got religion" and sanctioned
wrongdoers has caused aggregate wrongdoing to decrease.
18. W.H. Auden, The Fall of Rome, in 2 The Oxford Anthology of English Literature
2110, 2110 (Frank Kermode & John Hollander eds., 1973).
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Auden thus attributes an empire's collapse to materialism and petty
lawbreaking. Good government apparently requires most citizens to value
obeying the law intrinsically. Otherwise, the state's coercive mechanism is
overtaxed and it succumbs to crippling agency problems. Not much is
known about the distributions of the intrinsic value to obey different laws.
Demand theory in economics provides techniques for finding answers. The
aim is a causal model with power to describe the distribution of good
citizenship and predict its consequences.
Notes & Observations
